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OPINION
McKEE, Chief Judge.
Jose Osmin Mejia-Fuentes has filed a petition for review of a decision of the
Board of Immigration Appeals (ABIA@) that dismissed his appeal of an order of an
Immigration Judge (AIJ@) denying his applications for asylum and withholding of
removal. For the reasons that follow, we will grant the petition for review and remand
for further proceedings.
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY1
1

Since we write primarily for the parties, we need not set forth the factual or
procedural history in detail.
2

Jose Osmin Mejia-Fuentes applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief
under Article 3 of the Convention Against Torture (ACAT@).2 He based his claim for
relief on his contention that he had suffered past persecution by the Mara Salvatrucha
(AMS@), a violent criminal street gang in El Salvador, and that he feared future
persecution from MS if returned to El Salvador. He claimed that the persecution arose
from his resistance to that gang=s attempts to recruit him to be a member of the gang. He
thus rests his asylum claim on membership in a Aparticular social group,@ which he
defines as Ayoung men who morally oppose criminal gangs and who lack family ties.@

2

The Immigration Judge denied Mejia-Fuentes=s application for relief under the
CAT and the Board of Immigration Appeals held that the denial was proper. MejiaFuentes does not seek review of that ruling.
3

The IJ denied any relief and ordered Mejia-Fuentes removed to El Salvador. The
IJ held that the proposed social group did not have the requisite characteristics of a
particular social group under BIA precedent which requires a visible and innate identity
or under Third Circuit precedent. Administrative Record (AAR@) 402 (citing Matter of
Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211 (BIA 1985), In re H-, 21 I. & N. Dec. 337 (BIA 1996), and
Fatin v. INS, 12 F.3d 1233 (3d Cir. 1993), respectively). The IJ further held that the
proposed social group had no existence independent of the alleged persecution, and that
even if it did, Mejia-Fuentes Afailed to establish any persecution by this group as defined
under the law.@ Id. The IJ based his reasoning at least in part on a belief that the
evidence did not establish retaliation for Mejia-Fuentes=s rejection of the gang=s
recruitment efforts. Instead, the IJ concluded that the gang was motivated solely by
criminal intent in targeting Mejia-Fuentes and by a desire to increase its membership.3
On appeal, the BIA affirmed the IJ=s finding that Mejia-Fuentes did not meet his
burden of proof for asylum and withholding of removal Aby establishing that any past or
future mistreatment in El Salvador would be on account of a ground protected under the
Act.@ AR 2. The BIA said that even if Mejia-Fuentes=s Aevidence were deemed to be
sufficient to establish that the gang members actually sought to persecute him >on account
of= any moral objection to gangs and his lack of family ties, as opposed to their purely
criminal goal of enhancing their ranks, [Mejia-Fuentes] has nevertheless failed to
3

The IJ also questioned Mejia-Fuentes=s credibility, finding his testimony was so
Ameager and vague@ that corroboration, if available, was essential. AR 404.
4

demonstrate that >young men who morally oppose criminal gangs and who lack family
ties= have sufficient social visibility in El Salvador to be recognized as a >particular social
group= within the meaning of the Act.@ Id. (citations omitted).4
This petition for review followed.5

4

As to the IJ=s finding that Mejia-Fuentes was not credible, the BIA said: AWe need
not address the [IJ=s] determination that [Mejia-Fuentes] is not credible, for we conclude
that [Mejia-Fuentes] has failed to meet his burdens of proof even if assumed to be
credible.@ AR 2.
5

Our review of questions of law is de novo. Kamara v. Attorney General, 420
F.3d 202, 210-11 (3d Cir. 2005). We review the BIA=s statutory interpretation of the
Immigration and Nationality Act under the deferential standard of Chevron v. Natural
Resources Defense Counsel, 467 U.S. 837 (1984). If the statute is silent or ambiguous to
the specific issue, the question for the court is whether the agency=s interpretation is based
on a permissible construction of the statute. Fatin v. INS, 12 F.3d 1233, 1239 (3d Cir.
1993). Where, as here, the BIA issues its own decision, we review that decision. Li v.
Attorney General, 400 F.3d 157, 162 (3d Cir. 2005).
5

II. ASYLUM AND WITHHOLDING OF REMOVAL
Section 208 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (AINA@) gives the Attorney
General discretion to grant asylum to a removable alien. 8 U.S.C. ' 1158(a). However,
the grant of discretion is conditioned upon the alien establishing that s/he is a Arefuge@ as
defined in 8 U.S.C. ' 1101(a)(42)(A). Thus, the alien must establish that s/he was
persecuted Aon account of@ one of the five statutory grounds set forth in that section. See,
INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478 (1992).
III. DISCUSSION
Before discussing the merits of this petition for review, we must first address the
government=s contention that Mejia-Fuentes has waived any challenge to the BIA=s
decision.
The government submits that the BIA affirmed the IJ=s ruling that Mejia-Fuentes=s
limited testimony was insufficient to establish that MS members persecuted him. The
government argues that since Mejia-Fuentes does not challenge that determination in his
opening brief, he has waived any challenge to that ruling. See Anspach v. City of
Philadelphia, 503 F.3d 256, 259 n.1 (3d Cir. 2007) (failure to present an argument in an
opening brief constitutes waiver); Chen v. Ashcroft, 381 F.3d 221, 235 (3d Cir.
2004)(same). The government claims that the BIA=s unchallenged determination is
dispositive and precludes a ruling on his petition for review. See Kost v. Kozakiewicz, 1
F.3d 176, 182 (3d Cir. 1993) (AIt is well-settled that if an appellant fails to comply with
these requirements on a particular issue [i.e., set forth the issues raised on appeal and
6

present an argument in support of those issues in his opening brief], the appellant
normally has abandoned and waived that issue on appeal and it need not be addressed by
the court of appeals.@). We disagree.
The BIA did not hold that Mejia-Fuentes failed to establish past persecution or a
well-founded fear of future persecution. Rather, the BIA held that Mejia-Fuentes failed
to establish Athat any past or future mistreatment in El Salvador was or would be on
account of a ground protected under the Act.@ AR at 2 (italics added). The BIA based its
ruling squarely on its belief that Meija-Fuentes Afailed to demonstrate that >young men
who morally oppose criminal gangs and who lack family ties= have sufficient social
visibility in El Salvador to be recognized as a >particular social group= within the meaning
of the Act.@ AR 2. The BIA did not make any determination on the issue of persecution
because it determined that Mejia-Fuentes did not establish that his proposed social group
was a Aparticular social group.@ Mejia-Fuentes does challenge that ruling on appeal.
A.
After this case was fully briefed, we decided Valdiviezo-Galdamez v. Attorney
General (AValdiviezo-Galdamez II@), 663 F.3d 582 (3d Cir. 2011). There, we discussed
at length the BIA=s initial interpretation of the term Aparticular social group@ and its later
development of the requirement of Asocial visibility@ for determining whether a proposed
social group constitutes a Aparticular social group@ for purposes of asylum and
withholding of removal under the INA.
In Valdiviezo-Galdamez II, we held, inter alia, that the BIA=s requirement of
7

Asocial visibility@ which was applied in denying Valdiviezo-Galdamez relief, and which
was applied here by the BIA in denying Mejia-Fuentes relief, was not entitled to
deference under the standards established in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984), because it was inconsistent with a number of
cases in which the BIA had found that a proposed social group was a Aparticular social
group@ under the standard it had earlier established in Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec.
211 (BIA 1985), overruled on other grounds by Matter of Mogharrabi, 19 I. & N. Dec.
439 (BIA 1987). Valdiviezo-Galdamez II, 663 F.3d at 603-07.
Although the BIA can certainly change the requirements for establishing
membership in Aa particular social group,@ we explained in Valdiviezo-Galdamez II that
the BIA must Aannounce a principled reason@ for departing from established precedent,
and it had not done so in denying Valdiviezo-Galdamez=s claim that persons resisting
recruitment into MS could constitute a particular social group for purposes of establishing
refugee status. Id. at 608. We held that, unless or until the BIA provides a Aprincipled
reason@ for its departure from established precedent, its prior ruling in Matter of Acosta
should control inquiries into whether an aslyum applicant=s proposed social group
constitutes a Aparticular social group@ under the Act. Id.6
Our decision in Valdiviezo-Galdamez II is controlling here. Therefore, we will
6

We also noted in Valdiviezo-Galdamez II that the ABIA must not only announce a
>principled reason= for any changes it makes to its definition of >particular social group,=
any announced changes must be based on a permissible construction of the statute.@ 663
F.3d at 609 n.19.
8

grant this petition for review on the issue of Meija-Fuentes=s membership in a particular
social group and remand for further review for the BIA to analyze Mejia-Fuentes=s
proposed social group in a manner that is consistent with this opinion and our holding in
Valdiviezo-Galdamez II.
B.
Before concluding, we think it important to comment on the IJ=s conclusion that the
proposed social group has no existence independent of the alleged persecution by MS.
The BIA did not mention that finding in its decision. Nonetheless, the government cites
our decision in Lukwago v. Ashcroft, 329 F.3d 157 (3d Cir. 2003), in arguing that MeijaFuentes can not establish refugee status because his claimed social group has no existence
independent of the alleged persecution. In Lukwago, we stated that a A>particular social
group= must have existed before the persecution began.@ Id. at 172.
However, we disagree with the government=s contention that Mejia-Fuentes=s
proposed social group has no existence prior to, or independent of, the alleged
persecution. As noted, Mejia-Fuentes=s proposed social group is Ayoung men who
morally oppose criminal gangs and who lack family ties.@ In Valdiviezo-Galdamez I, we
held that a similar proposed social group existed independently of its persecution. We
wrote:
Before the IJ, Galdamez identified the particular social group
to which he belongs as Athose who have been actively
recruited by gangs but have refused to join because they
oppose those gangs.@ App. 185. In his brief, he identifies the
group as Ayoung Honduran men who have been actively
9

recruited by gangs and who have been persecuted by these
gangs for their refusal to accept membership.@ Appellants= Br.
25. In discussing the group, we omit the fact of the group=s
later persecution from its definition to make clear that the
group exists independently of its persecution. See Lukwago v.
Ashcroft, 329 F.3d 157, 172 (3d Cir. 2003) (A[T]he >particular
social group= must have existed before the persecution
began.@).

502 F.3d at 290 n.3 (emphasis added). With the exception of Mejia-Fuentes= addition of
persons lacking family ties to his proposed social group, we can see no difference
between Mejia-Fuentes=s proposed social group and Valdiviezo-Galdamez=s proposed
social group.
IV. CONCLUSION
For all of the above reasons, we will grant the petition for review and remand to
the BIA for its consideration of whether Mejia-Fuentes=s proposed social group
constitutes a Aparticular social group@ under the standard the BIA established in Matter of
Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 233-34 (BIA 1985), as explained in Valdiviezo-Galdamez II.
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